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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

------------ ------------------------------------------INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH
AMERICA,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 166011

vs.
LANSEAIR TRAVEL AGENCY, INC.,
et al.,
Defendant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF CASE
This is a bonding company subrogation case brought by the
Insurance Company of North America against Lanseair Travel Agency, Inc.,
Preben H. Nielsen and Rulon De Young.

The action was tried before the

Court without a jury.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
At the close of all evidence the Court dismissed the action
against Rulon DeYoung and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and Judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Lanseair Travel
Agency, Inc., and Preben H. Nielsen.

A Motion to alter and amend the

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and to enter a new judgment
was denied by the Court.

Preben H. Nielsen appeals from the initial
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Judgment and the Order denying the motion to alter or amend the Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and to enter a new judgment.

No appeal

was taken by the corporation.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Preben H. Nielsen seeks a reversal of the judgment against
him and judgment against Plaintiff, no cause of action, and that failing,
Appellant requests a new trial.
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STATEMENT OF FACT
Lanseair Travel Agency, Inc., is a Utah corporation that
maintains its principal place of business at Salt Lake City, Utah.

Preben

H. Nielsen was instrumental in forming the corporation in 1972 and at
that time the corporate purpose was to engage in the business of travel
agency principally in the State of Utah.

(Tr. 5)

Mr. Nielsen was a

stockholder and director of the corporation and owned in excess of fifty
percent ( 50%) of the issued stock.

There were other stockholders however.

In order to engage in the travel business, it is almost essential
that the agency receive an appointment from Air T raffle Conference of
America.

Air Traffic Conference (ATC) is an unincorporated trade

association formed by all of the domestic scheduled airlines in the United
States.

It maintains its place of business in Washington, D .C.

When

a travel agent is appointed an agency by ATC, that agent will then have
in its possession the ticket stock and validating stamps of the various
airlines.

This enables the agent to arrange travel in its office, issue

the necessary airline tickets and then bill the customer for the cost.
The agent customarily receives a 15% commission on the airline business
that it writes.

The customer is benefited because, as in the case of

many companies, they can arrange employee travel on a credit basis and
all of the details of travel are worked out by the agency.
One of the applications for agency status was introduced as
an exhibit in the case.

(Ex. 8)

As a condition to the appointment as an ATC agent it was
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necessary that Lanseair furnish a bond in the amount of $10, 000.

Both

the Application for Bond and the Indemnity portion of the bond, a part
of the application packet furnished to Lanseair by ATC, and the completed
bond application was returned by Lanseair to ATC and not the bonding
company.

(Tr. 76-77)

The bonding company is the Plaintiff - Respondent

herein, Insurance Company of North America (I NA) •
The Application for Bond and Indemnity Agreement signed
by Mr. Nielsen are extremely significant in the determination of this
case and a copy has been appended to this Brief.

We ask the Court to

be mindful that on the reverse side of Exhibit I and the last statement
on the bottom of the page reads:
"APPLICATION FOR BOND GIVEN BY TRAVEL AGENCY
TO AIR TRAFFIC CONFERENCE, WASHINGTON, D.C."
Mr. Nielsen did not at any time have any knowledge of any
relationship between ATC and INA and no knowledge whatsoever as to
the agent or broker with whom ATC conducted its INA bonding business.
(Tr. 77-78)
Shortly after the formation of Lanseair Travel Agency, Rulon
DeYoung became the principal employee of the business.

(Tr. 109)

Mr.

Neilsen had full time employment as an officer of Deseret Federal Savings
and Loan Association and supervised the Lanseair Travel Agency.

The

business was operated successfully and all remittances were timely made
to ATC for air transportation sold by the agency to and including the
31st day of August, 1974.
In the summer of 1974, Mr. DeYoung had expressed an interest
in acquiring the majority of the stock control of the agency.

Negotiations
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between Mr. Nielsen and Mr. DeYoung resulted in the execution of a
stock purchase agreement and promissory note on August 23, 19711.
(Ex. 12)
On that date (August 23, 19711) Mr. Nielsen wrote a letter to
Air Traffic Conference, a copy of the letter (Exhibit 116) is reproduced
at this point in the brief because of significance.
"August 23, 19711
Mr. John S. Rice
Air Traffic Conference of America
1000 Connecticut Ave. N. W.
Washington, D .C. 20036
RE:

Lanseair Travel Agency, Inc.
1836 West North Temple St.
Salt Lake City, Utah 811116

Dear Mr. Rice:
Referring to Agency Rules, Resolution 810a, Section B,
Paragraph ( 9), you are hereby notified that as of August
23, 19711 the controlling interest of Lanseair Travel Agency,
Inc. was transferred from P. H. Nielsen and S. L. Hardy
to Rulon De Young, 1015 East 3825 South, Salt Lake City,
Utah.
Mr. DeYoung, who has managed Lanseair Travel Agency,
Inc. since its beginning, has today purchased the stock
held by P.H. Nielsen and E.L. Hardy (113,500 shares) and
thus gained the controlling interest of said Agency. Mr.
DeYoung has today assumed the position of President
of Lanseair Travel Agency, Inc. and P.H. Nielsen and E.
L. Hardy have resigned from their positions with Lanseair
Travel Agency, Inc. leaving Mr. DeYoung free to name his
new officers and members of the Board of Directors.
Please change your records accordingly, and also be notified
that P. H. Nielsen and E. L. Hardy will assume no personal
liability or responsibility in connection with the future
business transactions of Lanseair Travel Agency, Inc., this
also applies to any possible personal liability or guaranty
with the ATC bond. Please notify your bonding company
of this change.
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Very truly yours,
P.H. Nielsen
P. H • Nielsen
2899 Branch Dr.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117"
The reason Mr. Nielsen wrote directly to ATC in connection
with the sale of the business and termination of his responsibility on
the bond is that was the only address he had ever been given.

This

ties directly with Plaintiff's Exhibit I, relative to the office to whom
the bond application should be delivered.
After August 23, 1974, Mr. DeYoung assumed full and complete
control of the business affairs of Lanseair Travel Agency.
It will be significant to note at this point that the ATC required
the travel agency to remit the amount received for airline tickets less
commissions on the tenth, twentieth and end of each month.
The remittance to ATC by Lanseair was made and the check
honored for the 30th of August, 1974.

(One week to the day after Appellant

sold the business and forwarded Exhibit 46 to ATC.)

Thereafter, for

the remittance period of September 10, 1974 the Lanseair check dated
September 13, 1974 in the amount of $3,742.83 was returned "refer to
maker".

(Exhibit 10)

Later, a check in the amount of $6,201.64 from

Lanseair Travel Agency, Inc., to ATC on the 25th day of September, 1974
was returned marked "refer to maker". (Exhibit II)
The reason that these checks were returned to the maker is
not clear from the evidence.

By the end of September, 1974, Mr.

De Young had ceased the business activities of Lanseair.

The bank account
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of Lanseair Travel showed a balance at the end of August of $1!1,685.17.
There were deposits to the account of approximately $10, 000.

There was

testimony also tha approximately $35, 000 was deposited in the account
in September.

At best the record on the balance of the account is

confusing and the reason why the two checks to ATC (Exhibits 10 and II)
were not honored by the bank is far from clear.
HS)

(Tr. 126 - 137, 2311 -

At all events, the first indication that Lanseair Travel Agency, Inc.

would not be able to continue in business was a letter from Plaintiff INA
to ATC dated September 10, 19711.

(Exhibit 20)

This letter indicates

that the bond was cancelled that date and that the can:ellation would
be effective October 10, 1974.
to Lanseair as well as ATC.

Evidently a copy of this exhibit was mailed
The action of INA preceded the delivery

and dishonor of the check dated September 13, 1974.

(Exhibit 10)

This

check appears to have been processed by the First Security Bank in
Salt Lake City on September 18, 1974 and returned as of that date.
There is no reason for the bonding company to have cancelled the bond
as of that date unless it had received word from ATC of a change in
agency status and the revocation of Mr. Nielsen's indemnity agreement.
Significantly, not one employee or other representative of INA appeared
at the trial to explain this action and not one representative of INA
even attended the trial.

There was no evidence whatever produced by the

Plaintiff to show why the bond was cancelled.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENT SIGNED BY
PREBEN H. NIELSEN WAS REVOKED BEFORE
THE DATE OF THE ALLEGED LOSS AND THE
LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT SO FINDING.

This point of argument and the following Point of Argument
are closely related and both require consideration of testimony and
exhibits relating to the Application for Bond (Exhibit I), Bond Verification
(Exhibits 16 through 19), the Bond (Exhibit 15), and the letter of
termination (Exhibit 46), letter to ATC (Exhibit 41) and Bond Revocation
(Exhibit 20).
The majority of the testimony relating to the case of INA came
from Ms. Darlene Dolan, an employee of ATC in Washington, D.C.

As

noted above, no one from INA appeared at the trial or testified in the action.
Ms. Dolan testified that she was a supervisor in the area of agency default
but was not knowledgeable on questions concerning the bond, bond
application and other correspondence appearing in the Lanseair file.
(Tr. 184)
Through Ms. Dolan, the Court permitted the introduction of
Exhibit 15, the "Bond", over objection.

(Tr. 153)

The Court will at

once note that the bond does not have appended to it a schedule of
travel agents.

The bond states as follows:

"KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS that Insurance
Company of North America, a corporation of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania with the home office in the City
of Philadelphia (herein called "Surety") is hereby held
and firmly bound unto Air Traffic Conference of America
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(herein called "Obligee"), as agent for and on behalf of any
airline member of Obligee contracting with Travel Agent(s)
(as named in the attached schedule or as it may be supplemented from time to time by adding, deleting or changing
names of Travel Agents therein) • "
No one will ever know, if in fact, Lanseair Travel Agency was ever
included on the schedule appended to the bond.
unknown.

Why it is missing is

However, since no one from IN A appeared at the trial to

explain this deletion or to supply a copy of the schedule we must assume
that no such schedule exists.

It bears a receipt date of August 10,

197(?) although it is dated the 31st day of August, 1966 and it bears

no identifying number.

Note on Exhibit 17, as an example, that a

so called schedule bond number 479771 is set forth but we have no way
of knowing whether those premium period receipts relate to the bond relied
upon by INA.

Furthermore, the evidence was conclusive that Mr. Nielsen

had never been furnished a copy of the bond.
The importance of this exhibit cannot be underestimated.

If

someone is to be charged with agreement of indemnity it is only fair
that the underlying agreement (in this case the bond), to which this
indemnity agreement allegedly attaches, be identified and the adverse party
given a opportunity to cross examine.

It should not have been admitted.

The Court is now referred to the Indemnity Agreement (Exhibit
I).

It is important to know that it does not contain any period nf

duration nor does it specify the manner in which it may be terminated
by either party.

It does contain the following statements which are

significant:
"Undersigned agrees that surety may decline to undertake
obligation applied for or may cancel or terminate the same,
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and will return any unearned premium due on demand, all
free of any claim for loss of damage by undersigned."

"The Undersigned further agrees to reimburse surety
for all expenses incurred in forcing the provision of this
policy, and agrees to pay premiums annually in advance
at a rate to be agreed upon."
As shown by the evidence, the agency operated successfully
through August 31, 1974.

On the 23rd day of August, 1974, negotiations

between Mr. Nielsen and the agency manager, Mr. De Young culminated
in an agreement of sale.

(Exhibit 12)

The agreement is signed by

Mr. DeYoung as President of the corporation and Mr. Nielsen and
Mr. Hardy as stockholders.
On that day, Mr. Nielsen directed his letter (Exhibit 4 and 46)
to ATC stating that the agency had been sold and requesting that they
advise their bonding company that he would no longer be responsible
on the bond.
Ms. Dolan testified that the letter, from Mr. Nielsen, was not
in the Lanseair file.

She did not testify that it was not received by

ATC and admitted that fia-d it been received by ATC it would have been
directed to someone other than herself.
have been at the time.

(Tr. 189)

She did not know who that would

Although she was not the person who

would have carried out the instruction to notify the bonding company,
she did testify that ATC would simply have ignored that request. (Tr. 190)
Of course, that does not prove that the person that received the letter
did not carry out the instructions it contained.
The additional fact that clearly shows that the bonding company
must have had knowledge of the termination of the indemnity agreement
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is that before there was any question about the status of the Lanseair
account, the bonding company gave the notice to ATC that it was
terminating the bond.

(Exhibit 20 dated September 10, 1974)

one from INA testified concerning the reason

No

bond was terminated

at a time when the affairs of Lanseair Travel were in perfect order.
It must be concluded that they had in fact received notice of the
cancellation of the indemnity agreement from Mr. Nielsen.
Where an indemnity agreement is silent as to its duration,
it may be cancelled by either party at will on notice.
"A contract of indemnity continues in force only during
such time as is expressly or impliedly provided for in
the contract, and at no time is fixed for its duration,
it is a contract terminable at the will of either party. "
41 Am Jur 2nd, Indemnity, Section 8.
The above principal is supported in the case of American Surety Company
vs. Blake, 54 Idaho I, 27 P2d 972.
The lower Court in substance found that Mr. Nielsen did
not prove that the letter of August 23, 1974 was ever delivered to ATC
or that INA had any notice or knowledge thereof and that ATC was not
the agent of INA so that notice given to them would be binding on the
bonding company.
Those findings which are paraphrased above are contrary to
the manifest weight of the evidence.

It was shown that either ATC or

INA directed that the indemnity agreement be delivered to ATC and that
was the only entity with which Mr. Nielsen had any dealings concerning
the bond.
him.

The letter was mailed by Mr. Nielsen and never returned to

A later letter, by Mr. Nielsen (Exhibit 41), was delivered to ATC

and was in their file at the time of trial.

This letter was mailed to the

identical address that Mr. Nielsen mailed the letter of August 23, 1974.
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This, coupled with the fact that the bonding company terminated, for
no apparent reason, leads to the inescapable conclusion that ATC had
notice and that the bonding company also had notice.
The bond in this case, admitted over objection, it unique.
The procedure of adding or deleting entities from a schedule from time
to time is not the usual methoe utilized by an insurance company to
bond an insurer.

Usually, an individual bond is written on each

undertaking assumed by an insurance company.

There are direct

dealings between insurance company, the party bonded, and the party
in favor of whom the bond is written.
of communication are absent.

In this case, most of these lines

Legal interpretation of this type of bond

is virtually nil except for the Hoyt case.
The point urged by Mr. Nielsen is that inasmuch as INA had
no communication with either Lanseir or Mr. Nielsen concerning the bond and
indemnity agreement, INA cannot be heard to complain that notice to ATC
of indemnity termination was not given to the property party.

On the

printed indemnity agreement appended to this brief it states:
"APPLICATION FOR BOND GIVEN BY TRAVEL AGENT TO
AIR TRAFFIC CONFERENCE, WASHINGTON D.C."
Contrary to the findings of the Court, ATC was obviously
the agent to INA to receive communications from indemnitors.

Mr. Nielsen

never had any communication from the bonding company prior to the alleged
loss and no knowledge of the offite of INA in which to direct communications
and would naturally deal with the same party to whom he had sent the
initial application.

INA is es topped from denying that ATC is an agent

for the purpose of receiving notices under the bond.
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POINT II:

BOND COVERAGE AND THE INDEMNITY
AGREEMENT TERMINATED FOR NONPAYMENT OF PREMIUM ON SEPTEMBER I,
19711 PRIOR TO THE ALLEGED LOSS.

The attention of the Court is invited to Exhibits 17, 18, ard
19 which are similar and are entitled Memorandum of Bond Verification.
The significance of each of these documents is that the premium period
in specified in each exhibit.
8/3/72 to 9/1/72.
to 9/1 /73.
9/1/711.

Exhibit 17 shows the premium period from

Exhibit 18 shows the premium period to be 9/1 /72

Exhibit 19 shows the premium period to be from 9/1 /73 to

There was never any premium paid by Lanseair Travel or

anyone else for any coverage beyond September I, 19711.
To the date of September I, 19711, the agency account of
Lanseair Travel Agency was in perfect order and the ATC was paid
for all airline tickets sold to that date.
by Mr. DeYoung.

(Tr. 126)

This was specifically testified to

INA does not contend otherwise.

The

claim of INA is for airline tickets sold subsequent to September I,
19711.
Although elementary, it is well remembered that:
" A contract of insurance must be assented to by both
parties either in person or by their agent. There
must be a meeting of the minds of the parties on the
essential terms and elements of the contract. These
essential terms include, in general, the following:
(I) the subject matter to be insured; ( 2) the risk
insured against; ( 3) the commencement and period
of the risk undertaken by the insurer; (II) the amount
of insurance; and ( 5) the premium and time in which
it is to be paid."
42 Am Jur 2nd, Insurance, Section 203.
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In this case the commencement was September I, 1973 and the
period was to September I, 1974.
paid annually in advance.

(Exhibit 19)

The premium was to be

(Ex. I)

The conclusion to be drawn is that when the premium period
expired on 9/1/74 the indemnity agreement terminated on that date because
there was no insurance contract to which indemnity could attach.
The case that supports this conclusion in all particulars is that
of Insurance Company of North America -vs- Hoyt, 419 F2d 1148 (1969).
In this case INA brought suit against an indemnitor on a bond issued
to Air Traffic Conference where a travel agent had been included on the
schedule bond.
The language of the indemnity agreement appears to be identical
with that of Exhibit I in this case.

The individual indemnity agreement

signed by Mr. Nielsen is identical.
In the Hoyt case, the agent applied for inclusion on the bond
in 1963.

The application was granted subject to Hoyt executing the

indemnity agreement.

Likewise, in 1964, the agent was included in the

schedule and again Hoyt signed an indemnity agreement.
was included but no new indemnity agreement was sent.

In 1965 the agency
A premium notice

was, however, furnished to the agency which was paid and the agency
included on the bond for the calendar year of 1965.

In June, the agency

defaulted in the amount of $71, 000 that it owed to ATC.
The lower court ruled that since a new indemnity agreement had
not been forwarded for the year 1965 that the company was satisfied that
there was no need for such personal guarantee.

The appellate court
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ruled, however, that the indemnity agreement was a continuing one and
was in effect during 1965 when the default occurred.

The Court also

ruled that Hoyt's attempt to cancel his indemnity agreement prior to
the loss was ineffectual.
In the Hoyt case the loss occurred during the period for
which a premium was paid.

The Court then made the following observation

on this subject which has particular application to our case.
"The indemnity obligation had no definite term of duration.
The agreements ran from year to year upon approved
application, or, after 1964, upon payment of premium. Corydon
paid the premium for the bond coverage for the full year of
1965, and thus the agreements were in effect during that year.
The facts here do not justify applying the rule from Mamerow
-vs- National Lead Co., 206 Ill. 626, 69 N.E. 504 (1903),
that a continuing guarantee, not limited as to duration and
amount, will be construed to be limited to a reasonable
time. The evidence here is plain that the indemnity was
continuous, but its duration was terminated by the failure
to pay in advance annually the premium required. " (Emphasis
added)
The distinction between this case and the Hoyt case is that the
loss in the Hoyt case occurred at a time when a premium had been paid
for coverage.

In our case, the loss occurred at a time subsequent to

the date of premium coverage.

As in the Hoyt case, this Court should

rule that when the agent did not pay a premium for coverage beyond
September I, 1974 that the indemnity agreement was thereby terminated.
That ruling is consistent with the only other published case on this
subject.

The lower Court ruled that coverage was effective through
October 10, 1974.

This ruling was based upon the fact that INA sent
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or delivered a letter dated September 10, 1974 indicating that coverage
would terminate as of October 10, 1974.

That ruling of the Court is

totally devoid of any legal or evidentiary basis.
The Court evidently based its ruling on the position taken
by INA that the bond contained a thirty day cancellation clause, (Exhibit
15) and a notice dated September 10, 1974 by INA stating that coverage

would terminate on October 10, 1974.

The Court committed a number

of errors in accepting the position advanced by INA.
As indicated above, Exhibit 15, the bond, should not have been
admitted into evidence because its admission lacked a proper foundation.
There was no schedule attached and it does not appear to bear any
relationship to the bond number set forth on the premium period documents.
The bond and the indemnity agreement are not consistent.
The indemnity agreement provides that premium must be paid annually
in advance.

The bond contains no provision relative to premium.

Neither Lanseair Travel Agency nor Mr. Nielsen were ever
furnished a copy of the bond and the bond is not in any manner made
a part of the indemnity agreement and none of the terms of the bond
are incorporated in the indemnity agreement.
The bond provides for a thirty day cancellation time.

The

indemnity agreement contains no such term and in fact states that the
bonding company may decline to undertake the obligation and may cancel
and terminate the same at its discretion - not after giving thirty days
notice.
More particularly, the Court misconstrued paragraph 5 of the
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bond relative to a thirty day cancellation notice.

This paragraph of

Exhibit 15 reads:
"If surety shall so elect, liability assumed with respect
to any named Travel Agency may be cancelled by giving
30 days written notice, sent by regular mail, to the last
known address of Obligee and Travel Agent(s). The
surety, however, will remain liable for any default occuring
during the period up to the expiration of said 30 days
notice." (Emphasis added)
The key to that paragraph is the underlined words "liability
assumed".

INA assumed liability only for an agent who had paid a

premium and

only then during the

of premium.

In this case, it ran from September I, 1973 to September I,

1974.

basis.)

(CF.

period of time covered by the payment

The Hoyt case where the premium was on a calendar year

After the termination of the premium period, on September I,

1974, the above quoted paragraph of the bond had no application.

applied only during the premium period.

It

As an example, if the bonding

company elected to terminate coverage on June I, 1974, it would be necessary
that they give notice and coverage would terminate on July I, 1974.
We do not know why INA took the course it did, since no one
from that company chose to come to Court an explain these procedures.
It certainly may be inferred, however, that where INA insures a thousand
or more travel agencies it enjoys a very special financial arrangement
with ATC and would likely want to protect that association.
course, is their business and their decision.

That, of

However, they cannot

unilaterally attempt to extend bond coverage, pay an alleged claim, and
drag the indemnitor along with them.
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The indemnity agreement must be construed strictly against
the bonding company under elementary principals of contract.

Its

wording and all inferences drawn therefrom must be construed in favor
of the indemnitor and against the indemnitee.
The other point that the lower Court ignored is this: if the
bonding company could select the date on which coverage would terminate,
at what period in time does that right expire?

The bonding company

choose September 10 as the day on which to give notice.

Why that date

is selected is a mystery insofar as this record is concerned except for
the fact that it may be logically inferred that prior to that date they
had received notice that Mr. Nielsen had revoked his indemnity agreement.
However, let us assume that INA chose November I as the date in which
they would give notice.

Would that be appropriate under the terms of

the bond, the indemnity agreement and the bond verification documents?
Suppose the bonding company had selected the date of January 15, 1975.
If INA could select September 1O as the date of cancellation notice, then
logically it could select any other date on into the future ad infinitim.
This

is the effect of the finding of the lower Court and bears absolutely

no support in the field of bonding law and indemnity agreements.
There must be a time when an indemnity agreement terminates.
That time in this case is at the end of the premium period.
other construction to be placed upon these instruments.

There is no

The bonding

company may choose to extend coverage to its obligee as a matter of
courtesy or for whatever reason, but it cannot bind an indemnitor to
that unilateral action.
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POINT Ill: THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN
EVIDENCE AS BUSINESS RECORDS THE
RECORDS OF THIRD PARTIES.
As indicated in this Brief, the only person who testified concerning loss was Ms. Darlene Dolan, an employee of ATC.

The loss, if

any occurred, came about by reason of the failure of Lanseair to remit
to ATC funds received for the sale of air transportation with the various
airlines.

She had no independent knowledge whatever of either the

amount or the extent of the loss with the exception, possibly, of the two
checks issued by Lanseair in September that were not honored by the
payee bank.
The approach taken by INA in proof of claim related to Exhibit
37, which is documentation prepared by Western Airlines, United Airlines,
Hughes Airwest, Frontier Airline and Continental Airlines; Exhibit 28 a
proof of loss prepared by Ms. Dolan; and Exhibit 36 a document prepared
by one John L. Haymaker, Jr., who did not appear in Court.

All of

these exhibits were admitted into evidence over the objection of Defendant.
None of the documents were prepared by personnel of A TC under the
supervision of Ms. Dolan.

None of the third parties who did prepare the

documents appeared to testify, and of course, were not subject to any
right of cross-examination by counsel for Defendant to determine whether
in fact these instruments were trustworthy.
In an interchange between counsel and the Court on the
admission of these documents the Court erroneously set the legal basis
for introduction in the following manner:

"MR. GARRETT: Well, it contains heresay evidence again.
Hearsay testimony.
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MR. DART: It's a business record received by the company,
Your Honor.
THE COURT:
in, huh?

I'll let it in.

Might as well let it all come
(Plaintiff's Exhibit Numbers 27
and 36 received in evidence.)

MR. GARRETT:

I noticed.

THE COURT: Well, you know, that's the modern trend,
let everything in." (Tr. 182)
Contrary to the position the Court took in regard to the admission
of the hearsay evidence, the correct rule is set forth in 30 Am Jur 2nd,
Evidence, Section 9 51 :
"A book of accounts is to be regarded as a book of
original entries notwithstanding, entries therein are
copies from sales and other memoranda slips, tags, etc.,
if the entries were made in the usual course of business
within a reasonably short time after the transactions
themselves, and is admissible if supported by the testimony
of others upon whose information the entries were made,
to the effect that the statements are true, in addition to
the testimony of the bookkeeper to the effect that he
correctly entered the matter as stated by him. If the
entrant made the entries upon reports of another who
had personal knowledge of the transactions reported by
him, then the entrant ought to be produced and required
to testify that he made the entries correctly in conformity
with the reports; and his testimony should be supplemented
by the testimony of the one who made the reports, so that
their combined testimony will be equivalent to the testimony
of an entrant having personal knowledge . 11
The rules of evidence have not been relaxed to the point
indicated by the lower Court.

The test of trustworthiness of evidence

inevitably arises from a proper foundation and the test of cross examination.

Neither of these fundamental legal principals had application

under the Court's ruling.

20
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POINT IV:

THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
ADMIT DOCUMENTS IN EVIDENCE THAT
PROVED AN OFFSET IN FAVOR OF LANSEAIR
TRAVEL IN THE AMOUNT OF $7,572.87.

Rulon DeYoung who purchased the majority stock on August
23, 1974 and was in full control of the business of Lanseair Travel
from that point to when it ceased business in the later part of September,
1974, testified extensively relating to a credit due Lanseair against any

sums or amounts owing to ATC.

The documents comprising this credit

were labled as a group Exhibit 45.

Mr. DeYoung was asked to explain to

the Court the exhibit and the meaning and effect of those documents.
Each of the documents comprising Exhibit 45 represented either an unused
ticket or a ticket that was paid for by the customer by credit card.
Where the customer paid by credit card, ATC collected that money and
not the agency.

Where the ticket was paid for by cash or other credit,

Lanseair remitted the amount of the ticket sale three times per month.
The exhibit consisted of unused tickets that had been paid for by Lanseair
or tickets that had been paid for by the use of a credit card.

In both

cases, according to Mr. DeYoung, these tickets represented monies to
which Lanseair was entitled and for which credit should have been given
against any claim of ATC.

(Tr. 248-253)

The Court refused to allow this exhibit into evidence.
Court did, however, permit a proffer for the record.

(Tr. 255)

The
At

that time counsel indicated that the claim was in the exact amount of
$7, 572. 87.

This by way of proffer, for the record, after the Court

had refused to consider the evidence of offset.

(Tr. 255)
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The Court did not think that the offset was a relevant claim
against INA and so indicated in the record (Tr. 253)
Each of the credits would have been reflected in the report
of September 20 through September 30, 1974 to ATC, but no report
was made.

(Tr. 252-253)
The matter of credit was called to the attention of the man

from Frontier Airlines that came to the office of Lanseair in September
of 1974 to pick up the stamps and ticket stock.

Mr. Jeff Lyman advised

Mr. DeYoung that he would be advised in the matter of credit.
To say the least, the Court's refusal to admit evidence of the
credit was a complete philosophical re..ersal of form.

In the matter of

the admission of the hearsay evidence submitted by ATC relative to the
amount of the claim everything was admitted.

In the matter of the

evidence of offset against that claim nothing was admitted.
the modern trend, appears to be to let everything in.

This, although

In denying

evidence of the offset, the Court misconceived the law on the subject
of indemnity and subrogation.
A defense good against the obligee on a bond is good against
the bonding company obligor in a later suit against an indemnitor.
An example of this principal is contained in the case of Producing

Properties, Inc., -vs- Sohio Petroleum Co., 428 S.W.2d 365 (Texas).
:J !'I A
"We think the rule applicable here is that when an indemnitee
pays a third"p~rty's money claim against an indehtnitor to
which claim the indemnitor had a good defense, the indemnitee
is not entitled to recover against the indemnitor. Price v.
Steves, 175 S.W.2d 450 (Tex.Civ.App., San Antonio 1943,
writ re'f w. o. m.). See also 42 C.J.S. Indemnity Section
12, page 580 and cases there cited. Had the Unit Operator
sued PPI in March. 1967 or later on an obligation incurred
January I, 1962 PPl's defense of limitations would have been
good. Had the operator sued Sohio on the alleged obligation
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To hold otherwise would mean than an indemnitee by
the payment of an indemnitor's debt which is barred by
limitations can deprive an indemnitor of its legal
defense against the alleged indebtedness. Under such
circumstances the payment by the indemnitee will be
a voluntary payment for which it is not entitled to a
judgment against the indemnitor under its indemnity
contract."
See also 111 Am Jur 2d, Indemnity, Section 36, 35 and the Restatement,
Restitution Section 80.
As indicated by the evidence, the credit to which Lanseair was
entitled was mentioned to the agent of ATC when he visited the agency in
September 1974 and picked up the stamps and ticket stock at the time
Lanseair ceased business.
The evidence shows that the bonding company paid this loss
on only one document and that is the proof of loss submitted by ATC.
(Exhibit 28)

Two communications, Exhibit 23 and 24, preceded the proof

of loss and appear to be form letters to INA or its agent alerting them
to a potential loss.
There is no evidence whatsoever that the insurance company
investigated the claimed loss in any particular whatsoever.

There is no

evidence that a claims representative called upon Lanseair to determine
the status of the account or to get whatever facts Lanseair had that
would bear on the amount of the loss and no evidence that the data
submitted by the airlines was accurate or factual.

The only evidence

of loss are the two checks (Exhibits 10 and II) issued to ATC which
were returned to maker.

These total $10,144.37.

The offset is $7,572.87.

The difference is $2, 571. 50.
The indemnity agreement speaks of payments made in good
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faith by the surety.

Payment on a proof of loss without any investi-

gation does not meet that requirement.
any amount

INA could, of course, pay

due ATC on any evidentiary basis that it thought proper.

But, if it later charges an indemnitor it must show that the payment
was made in good faith.

It would certainly seem that the good faith

requirement of the contract would at least put the burden upon INA
to show that it investigated the claim in a reasonable manner.

This it

did not do and produced no evidence to that effect.
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CONCLUSION
The lower Court seemed to adopt the attitude in this case
that INA had issued a bond and required an indemnity agreement before
issuance.

INA paid a loss to ATC and was therefore entitled to reim-

bursement from the indemnitor in the amount of $10, 000; attorneys fees
of $3, 000; costs incurred in the prosecution of the matter of $811. 85;
interest in the amount of $24. 75; total $16,286.85.
Not one person representing INA attended the trial or testified.
The only evidence came from one employee of ATC.
The evidence was clear:
I.

The the premium period expired September I, 1974, prior

to the alleged loss.

The indemnity agreement also expired that date.

This conclusion is fully supported and announced by the only other
reported case on this subject, which incidentally involves the same
insurance company and the same type of bond and indemnity agreement.
2.

Mr. Nielsen effectively and legally terminated his indemnity

agreement by letter written August 23, 1974.
Appellant Nielsen is entitled to prevail on either of the foregoing
principArs and the Court should reverse the judgment of the lower Court
and dismiss the action.

If the Court does not reverse and dismiss the action then a
new trial is indicated upon the following grounds:
I.

The error committed by the Court in the admission of
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evidence without proper foundation.
2.

The failure of the Court to allow the $7,572.87 offset.

A

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/

3

day of January,

1980.

Edward M. Garrett
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lllSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA

A. T.C. Schedule Bond Application

Applies.ti.on le hereby made to Insurance Company of North America for lncluslo
j)pl!cant In a Schedule Bond in favor of the Air Traiflc Con!erence of America,

1• Name of Travel Agency _ _ _-=L~an~s~e~a~1~·r._~Tr:..::a:v;P.:l;::-:A~e=n~c':'-::~I~n=c::';-.----__;~~--li'.9-~~~(please print or type)

0

0 !ndlvldual
• Business Address
2

Partnership

1836 West North Temple,

u

3.

lndlvldual proprietorship or partnership, give name(s) and residence address(es)
composing same (please type or print):
Name

N/A

Address _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

4, If corporation, give names of Executive Officers, or i! closely held, give, name(s) of Principal Stockholder(s) (Please type or print):
Director

President--'P,_...,H=~N=i-"e-=1-=s-=e-=n"----------~'-E,._..•..,L"'._...H.,.ar,._,d,..y'----------Director

Secret:irY.----------------'~---W,,,__.....
M.,..__.,D"'u""r""h..,a.m....__ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Principal Stockholder_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

s.

How long have you been engaged in the Travel Agency Business? new
6. How many employees
do you h\l,ve ?_2____ 7. Do you bo_nd your employees 7 yes
a. Do you carry burglary and robbery insurance?_.~y~e.,s.___ _

9. (a) Have you ever defaulted on a ~ontract? .!l.2_(b) Have you ever been bankrupt or lnsolvent?_.ru!_
(c) Are there any judgments, suits or claims pending against you? ..llll..-(d) Have you or any of ;•our
If your answer ls "Yes" to any
employees ever been cancelled from the ATC .-\gency List? no
part of Question ~. give fl.l!I particl.l!ars on an attached statement.
10. (a) Stat£ tot:il of your sales of tickets for air transportation wholly within the Continental
United States during the last 12 calendar months immediately prior to the date of this
application . • • . • . • • • • • • •
• • . • • . • • . • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • $......:..:N"-'/A;.::__ _
(b) State total of accounts receivable on such tickets for air transportation as of last _ __;•...;O...;O'---Finar.c ial Statement . . . . • • . • • • • • • . • • • • • • . • • . • • • • • • • • • • • $
(o) State the amount of total domestic air transportation sales (excluding your commissions)
for each of the 3 highest months of the last 12 referred to in (a/ above:
/
Mor.th
i_;:;N:i..t:;:.;A'----

Month _ _ _ _ _

S-----

Month _ _ _ _ _ :; _ _ _ __
State the aver:ige of the above 3 highest manths

(d)

s

NIA

ll. Do you understand that these moneys are the property of the Carrier and are to be held by you orly
u.'tfl sati~factorily •ccounted for and rer.litted to the Carrier? --------------~--'
!!. Name and Address of Bank(s.) where moneys subject to this bond are depos.J.ted----------First Security Bank of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah
ll. Amount of bond required (See Instructions)

10, 000, 00.4. E!fectlve Date Cbanue present bond from
Barnes World Travel Agency
IS. Do you have your books periodic:illy audited by a Public Accountant or c P.A.? ~ 1! so, how !re1
quently?..Year Ji:rive name and :iddress of Accountant and date of l:ist audit: _N>J.J.,A<io~----------

16 ·

$

FL~Al'CIAL INFOR~L\. TlON: Attach your most recent complete Financial Statement :is prepare.d~,.;bmiv.,v11
cu-.r_ _ _ __
''"

0

'uit:int
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(over)

Exhibit "A"

.:;:'PLAINTIFF'S

::~ti"UCHl~f!' .:

.;:-- ~'2-~~2~.J_:::c

..

.

INDEMNITY AGnEEMENT

The widersigned hereby a!!lrm(s) that the statements contained 111 tho forcc;olr.c; a;ipllcltloQ
and are made without reserv:it1011 and that they are mac!i= to Induce Insurance Company of Xorlh ;,.,
herelllllfter called Sure~y. to Include the widorslgned In a Schedule Bond ls!ucd In favor of lie A/.r,,
Coafcrence of America, Including any_ continuation thereof or any suceos:iory ob II gallon. t:ndcrsli:n~,.
that Surety may declln_e to undert:ike obligation applkd for or may cancel or :cr:nlnate same OJ!d .. iuy W1earned premium due, on demand, all free ol'aisy claim for los11 or damage by undc;sli;ne~:1,:
alderatlon of the Inclusion· of the widenlgned In the Schedule Bond as a!orcsald, the widcrslsntd '1
1
perform all the conditions o! all agreements entcre~ Into with Air Trame Conference of Amcrlc~\
capacity as agent for the seve_ral air carriers which are parties to the Air Tra!flc Con!erencei1
Resolution, and will fully indemnify and save Surety harmless from and agalast any and :ill loss 9
chargu, suits, damages, coWJsel fees and e.'Cpenses 9f wh_atever kind or nature which the Surety shatt';
or lnc~r or be put to, by re:i.son or in consequence of the Surety·havL"'lg Included the U."'lderelOll~'
&!oresaJd Schedule Bond, or any contl::iuatton thereof or any successory obligation In the s:i:ne or u•'
amount; further agreeing that Surety shall have the excluslvi= rtzi)t to adjust, eettle, or comproc4'
alaim Wider thls obligation., and any voucher or other evidence oi any less, costs and expenses paid•.'
faith 'by the Surety shall be prlma !acle evidence of t.'ie fact and c."tent of the liability o! the Wldar;'
u well as of the respective heirs, executors, adminlst:-ators, successors and assigns or the ilnceri!
The undersigned expressly waive(s) the bene!lt of :iny exemption to which the widersii;:ied l!laybe~
under law.
The widerslgned further agrees to rel_mburse Surety !or all e.~pe:ises Incurred in~
!he provtafoDS o! thia Agreement, and ai;rees to pay premiums annually In advance at a rate to be aira~J

Salt Lake Cjty, Utah

Dated at

. '

thls _ __.2,,.9..,t..h.___ _ day

cif-...iI.1111_.,l;y;y~-,I;

.

- - - - - - - - - - - - ·Witness·

Signature o! App!Jcant
(i/ U,t/,'vitit1.J

M

Title ---'--'---

, . , ••• aJtip)

IF CORPORATION

SJ~

Here:

Atteet:

t

Lanseai:t Travel Agencv, Inc,

--~-·_ _ _ , , - - - - - - - - - - - - - :.Secret~ry.
: : - - - - - - - : B y _ _ _-. 1.~ (~ ·am- e-" -~·: ;z~r~ ra~t~i,;:._.; ; : ~:" :'~·~-~ "',
~ Pr~.
AGREEMENT
To be exeeuted by the Executive Officers of s:iid Corpor:ition in their individual
indemnitors\

cap~cities,

ore:•

In consider:itlon of the l'lsur;ince Compan)' cf Korth .-\meric:i executing the cbl!~~tic>n he_r~in :;;:·'
and-warranting sw!icicnt intcrcst"in ;.:.pplic:int's :!!fairs and intending to bo? bound by J.pplic;i:.:'s ol:''.:•
tn the.o .. ·
Indemnity Agreement.

the undcrsii;ned jointly !ind severally hereby agree(s) to indemnify the Surety and JO>n(s)

witti~·''•.JR
·"';' ·-~/

~·/
ure

~

(-?fff!ft)(ia{~,/«
a,~:..~,.~_'

:

-

~-

"J>,!

! ;,.·~

---------------------Title-

------------,--

__,;;,..:...~--~:~~-·~·

.

~·-~ ~>.··.~·-~_··.- t~ ~ t-."·
--

~Title-

:"=·...:. •'-...~

~-

:.

···-··-·

· .. ·.•

.• ' f ' ... ......

---------------------Title-

·..
....

.APP.0C~J'IO::i'.FOR BOND GIVEN'

-

BY TR.WEL AGENT

..TQ-_Alll·rR ..\fFIC CONF-q'l.ENCE, \\'ASll!NGTON, 0. C.
-

......
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ApRellants Brief
was mailed to: B. L. Dart, Attorney at Law, 430 Ten Building, Salt Lake
Lake City, Utah and Richard N. Cannon, Attorney at Law, 466 East Fifth South,
Salt Lake City, Utah this c2/;;I- day of January, 1980.

~~-LL

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

